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I. INTRODUCTION
Both statutory close and closely held corporations display an
obvious difference from the publicly held corporation with its large
1. The organizers of a California corporation with thirty-five or fewer shareholders must
make a choice. Section 158 of the California Corporations Code permits an eligible corporation
to be formed as a so-called "close corporation." Substantive eligibility requires that the shares
of the corporation be held of record by no more than thirty-five shareholders. Procedural
requirements are that an appropriate limitation on the number of shareholders and the
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number of shareholders who do not participate directly in the op-
eration of the corporate enterprise. The small corporate enterprise is
the quintessential example of either the owner-operated business or
of the enterprise whose few non-managing shareholders keep a close
watch on the managing shareholders. Such close personal association
between management and the shareholders not only merits but man-
dates the consideration of infusing special protective control devices
into the corporate structure.
Of paramount concern to present participants in this kind of
corporate enterprise is the ability to control who will become asso-
ciated with the enterprise in the future. Intertwined with this concern
is the problem of assuring shareholders that their respective propor-
tional ownership interests in the corporation will not be diluted
through the sale of corporate shares to additional shareholders. The
devices which can be utilized to achieve the kind of control and
security desired by the shareholders of a closely held corporation are
the focus of this article.
II. SPECIAL SHAREHOLDER QUALIMCATIONS
Section 204(a)(3) of the California Corporations Code provides
that the articles of incorporation may require that only persons
possessing special qualifications may become shareholders.
2 In the
case of a statutory close corporation such a provision may be inserted
in a shareholders' agreement rather than in the articles of incorpo-
ration.
3
It is thus possible to limit the transferability of outstanding shares,
and the issuance of newly authorized shares, previously authorized
statement, "This corporation is a close corporation," be expressed in the articles of incorpo-
ration. CAL. CORP. CODE § 158 (West Supp. 1989). The primary benefits of forming an eligible
corporation as a close corporation are that voting or pooling agreements and shareholders'
agreements executed by close corporation shareholders are given statutory validity. CA.. CORP.
CODE § 706(a) (West 1977); CAL. CoRP. CODE §§ 186, 300(b) (West 1977).
A corporation with no more than thirty-five shareholders does not automatically become
a close corporation. Lack of the required additional provisions in the articles of incorporation
leaves it a generic "closely held" corporation.
In order to make necessary distinctions in this article, corporations having elected "close
corporation" status will be referred to as "statutory close" corporations. Other small corpo-
rations will be referred to as "closely held." See Berger, Statutory Close or Closely Held
Corporation? 11 PAC. L.J. 699 (1980) (discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of
forming an eligible corporation as a dose corporation).
2. CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(a)(3) (West Supp. 1989).
3. CAL. CORP. CODE § 300(b), (c) (West Supp. 1989).
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but unissued shares, and treasury shares, 4 by providing that only
persons having a specified educational or business background, or
professional or vocational expertise, may become shareholders. This
limitation is a potentially valuable device in a corporation conducting
a specialized or unique type of business operation. To the extent that
the imposition of such a special qualification is used in a corporation
in which all of the shareholders are actively participating in the actual
running of the enterprise, it may serve a useful purpose. Depending
upon the nature of the enterprise, however, imposing special quali-
fications on shareholder status may prevent the corporation from
raising needed capital in future years by unduly limiting the pool of
potential investors.
If used in conjunction with the usual first-option transfer restric-
tion,5 a shareholder qualification provision also has the potential
effect of locking present shareholders into their investment since the
decision by the corporation and/or the other shareholders not to
purchase the shares of a fellow shareholder leaves the latter with the
difficult task of finding a qualified purchaser for his6 shares. The
ability to impose special shareholder qualifications should therefore
be used only after careful analysis of the potential consequences and
an explanation of these consequences by the attorney to the partici-
pants in the corporation. Since a provison requiring special qualifi-
cations for shareholder status is, in effect, a transfer restriction, its
existence must be noted on the share certificates .7
III. SUPER-mAJoRiY VoTING REQUEMENTS
The issuance by a corporation of additional shares can have a
drastic effect on the position of its shareholders. A shareholder who
owns 1,000 of a corporation's 10,000 outstanding shares will have
4. Since its revision in 1977, the California Corporations Code no longer specificallyrefers to "treasury shares." Once outstanding shares which are reacquired by the issuingcorporation are now considered authorized but unissued shares. CAL. CoRP. CODE § 510(a)(vest Supp. 1989). The term treasury shares is nevertheless used in this article as a genericterm for once outstanding shares which as a result of a repurchase, redemption or otherwise
have been reacquired and are presently held by the issuing corporation.
5. See infra text and accompanying notes 62-107 (Section VI discusses first-option transfer
restrictions).
6. By use of words in the masculine gender, the author intends to include the femininegender and intends no offense. The purpose of this usage is to be consistant with quotations
from statutes and cases.
7. CAL. CORP. CODE § 418(a)(1) (vest Supp. 1989).
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his proportionate voting power reduced by fifty percent if that
corporation issues 10,000 additional shares, unless of course he can
purchase some of those additional shares. Similarly, the issuance of
additional shares decreases each shareholder's proportionate dividend
and liquidation distribution rights.
One method that can be utilized to protect shareholders against
the dilution of their respective interests in the corporation, is to
impose super-majority voting requirements as a prerequisite to the
issuance of additional shares. 8 Thus, higher than normal voting
requirements can be required for shareholder approval of an amend-
ment to the articles of incorporation which provides for an increase
in the corporation's authorized shares,
9 and also for approval by the
board of directors for the issuance of previously authorized but
unissued shares.' 0 In a statutory close corporation, such super-ma-
jority voting requirements can be inserted in a shareholders' agree-
ment instead of in the articles of incorporation."
IV. PREEMPTIVE RIGHrs
The primary device used to protect present shareholders against
the dilution of their respective proportionate interests in the corpo-
ration is embodied in the common law preemptive rights doctrine.
Preemptive rights entitle each present shareholder to buy a sufficient
number of the additional shares to be issued by the corporation to
maintain his present proportionate ownership interest in the corpo-
ration. Thus, a ten percent shareholder must be given the opportunity
to buy ten percent of the additional shares.
Reliance on the preemptive rights doctrine to protect the share-
holders of a closely held or statutory close corporation is fraught
with difficulties. First, a shareholder must be financially able to buy
the shares when they are offered; inability to raise the necessary
funds, in effect, makes the protection meaningless. In addition, the
limited scope of the common law preemptive rights doctrine gives
only partial protection, and careful drafting is necessary to devise a
8. Id. §§ 204(a)(5), 602(a) (Vest Supp. 1989).
9. Id. §§ 204(a)(5), 602(a) (West Supp. 1989).
10. Id. § 204(a)(5) (West Supp. 1989).
11. Id. Because the Secretary of State can refuse to accept for filing documents which do
not conform to law, it is generally considered preferable to keep the articles of incorporation
as simple as possible and to insert optional provisions in other corporate documents whenever
legally permissible. See generally id. § 110(a) (West 1989).
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provision that will enlarge that right to the maximum extent possible
without stultifying the corporation in its legitimate attempts to raise
capital when needed in future years.
Unlike some other states, California does not extend to corporate
shareholders the protection of the preemptive rights concept as a
matter of common law. Section 406 of the California Corporations
Code provides that the board of directors may issue shares "without
first offering them to shareholders" unless a provision to the contrary
takes away that authority. 12 Such a provision to the contrary, in
other words a preemptive rights provision, can be inserted in the
articles of incorporation13 or, in the case of a statutory close cor-
poration, in a shareholders' agreement.14 It is therefore crucial that
an appropriate provision be drafted and set forth in the statutorily
specified document.
Routine utilization of the traditional boiler-plate language to the
effect that "shareholders shall have full preemptive rights as defined
by law" is incomplete protection and constitutes an invitation to
future litigation. A discussion of what constitutes an appropriate
provision requires a brief excursion into the limitations of the com-
mon law doctrine of preemptive rights.
A. Preemptive Rights at Common Law
The common law preemptive rights doctrine only applies to newly
authorized shares sold by the corporation for cash." It does not
apply to the sale by a corporation of previously authorized but
unissued shares, or of treasury shares, 6 nor does it apply to the
issuance of newly authorized shares used by the corporation to
purchase property or facilitate a merger. 17 Thus, inserting into the
appropriate corporate document the kind of general boiler-plate
language quoted in the preceding paragraph confers very limited
protection to the shareholders. This is especially true because of the
12. CAL. CoRp. CODE § 406 (West Supp. 1989).
13. Id. § 204(a)(2) (West Supp. 1989).
14. Id. § 204(a) (West Supp. 1989).
15. See, e.g., Stokes v. Continental Trust Co. of City of New York, 186 N.Y. 285, 78N.E. 1090, 1094-95 (1906): "We are thus led to lay down the rule that a stockholder has aninherent right to a proportionate share of new stock issued for money only and not to purchase
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almost universal utilization of either first-option transfer restrictions
and/or buy-out agreements, in the closely held or statutory close
corporation. Both of these create a great likelihood that the corpo-
ration will reacquire some of its own shares which could be reissued
in future years and would not normally be encompassed by the
common law preemptive rights concept.
Case law has created a number of exceptions which have extended
the protections of the preemptive rights doctrine to- fact situations
otherwise not covered by it. Thus, it has been held that shareholders
have a preemptive right to purchase originally authorized but unissued
shares when those shares are issued a substantial period of time after
the corporation was originally organized. 8 The rationale for this
exception rests on the presumed intention of the organizing share-
holders. Leaving a newly formed corporation with unissued shares is
normally viewed as the expression of an intent that the originally
planned capitalization consist of the potential issuance of all author-
ized shares. Thus, an initially purchasing shareholder is regarded as
having acquiesced to gauging his proportionate ownership interest on
the basis of all authorized shares, rather than on the basis of only
the immediately issued shares. If those originally authorized shares
are not issued for a long time, however, some courts have accepted
the argument that the long-standing voting power distribution based
on the issued shares has achieved such a fundamental status that the
issuance later of originally authorized shares is equivalent in impact
to the issuance of newly authorized shares - that is, it upsets what
has become a traditional system of voting control and profit distri-
bution.' 9 Obviously, the same reasoning can be used to support the
argument that preemptive rights should apply to the issuance of
treasury shares which were not cancelled by the corporation when
reacquired and which are then proposed to be issued a substantial
period of time after their acquisition by the corporation.
From a pragmatic viewpoint, however, it is foolhardy to rely for
protection on such judicially created exceptions when organizing a
18. Titus v. Paul State Bank, 32 Idaho 23, 179 P. 514 (1919); Carlson v. Ringgold County
Mutual Telephone Co., 252 Iowa 748, 108 N.W.2d 478 (1961); Hanny v. Sunnyside Ditch
Co., 82 Idaho 271, 353 P.2d 406 (1960); Humboldt Driving Park Assoc. v. Stevens, 34 Neb.
528, 52 N.W. 568 (1892); Morris v. Stevens, 178 Pa. 563, 36 A. 151 (1897); Glenn v.
Kittannning Brewing Co., 259 Pa. 510, 103 A. 340 (1918). Thurmond v. Paragon Colliery
Co., 82 W. Va. 49, 95 S.E. 816 (1918).
19. See, e.g., Yasik v. Wachtel, 25 Del. Ch. 247, 17 A.2d 309 (1941); Ross Transport,
Inc. v. Crothers, 185 Md. 573, 45 A.2d 267 (1946); Dunlay v. Avenue M Garge & Repair
Co., 253 N.Y. 274, 170 N.E. 917 (1930).
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closely held or statutory close corporation in California. There appear
to be no California cases on point, and cases from other states have,
as is to be expected, differed in their interpretation of what length
of time constitutes a sufficiently substantial period to justify this
enlargement of the common law preemptive right.20 In view of the
fact that the issuance of additional shares is one of the traditional
"squeeze-out" techniques used to get rid of minority shareholders,
failure to draft an all-embracing preemptive rights provision because
of the existence of this body of exceptional cases in effect means the
likelihood of litigation in future years by shareholders who need this
protection.
The preemptive rights problem is further complicated by the lim-
itation, already mentioned, that the common law doctrine does not
offer protection to shareholders unless the corporation is issuing the
additional shares for cash. Shares, even newly authorized shares, are
not subject to the common law preemptive right when issued in
exchange for property or services, 2' in cancellation of a debt owed
by the corporation,22 or to effect a merger. 23 The justification for
this limitation on shareholder protection is born of necessity - a
corporation would be frustrated in its ability to obtain needed prop-
erty or services, for example, if it has to sell the shares to shareholders
rather than to the seller of the property or services. There is an
unspoken assumption, of course, that the seller of the property
needed or desired by the corporation is not willing to take cash but
only shares; but with one exception, 24 the cases so far have not
delved into the argument that preemptive rights can only be denied
in such a case. This argument has merit. If the seller of property is
willing to take cash, it would be more fair to sell shares to the
present shareholders and to use the cash so generated to buy the
property than to issue the shares to the seller of the property and
thereby disturb the existing allocation of voting and economic rights
in the corporation. The point once again is that careful drafting
should fill the gap by specifying that preemptive rights do apply
unless, for example, needed property cannot be obtained except for
20. See, e.g., Yasik, 25 Del. Ch. at 247, 17 A.2d at 309; Ross Transport, 185 Md. at
573 45 A.2d at 267; Dunlay, 253 N.Y. at 274, 170 N.E. at 917.
21. Curtis v. Briscoe, 129 So. 2d 450 (Fla. App. 1961); Meredith v. New Jersey Zinc &
Iron Co., 55 N.J. Eq. 211, 37 A. 539 (1897).
22. Musson v. New York & Queens Elec. Light & Power Co., 138 Misc. 881, 247 N.Y.S.
406 (1931).
23. Bingham v. Savings Investment & Trust Co., 102 N.J. Eq. 302, 140 A. 321 (1928).
24. Fuller v. Krogh, 15 Wis. 2d 412, 113 N.W. 2d 25 (1962).
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the issuance of shares, or unless a debt instrument requires that the
debt be extinguished through the issuance of shares to the creditor.
B. Drafting Preemptive Rights Provisions
In the publicly held corporation the existence of preemptive rights
creates pragmatic problems. Having to offer additional shares first
to present shareholders causes delays in the corporation's efforts to
raise capital, limits its financial flexibility, and may increase the cost
of underwriting. In addition, publicly held corporations often have
more than one class of shares outstanding; and trying to unravel the
mystery of which classes of shares have preemptive rights to the
additional shares, or worse yet, to convertible debt instruments to
be issued, may well be beyond the grasp of ordinary mortals.2S Where
state law permits, it is therefore the common practice to eliminate
preemptive rights in publicly held corporations.
Such concerns have little if any applicability to the closely held or
statutory close corporation, however, where different policy factors
and pragmatic needs justify not only the retention but indeed the
expansion of shareholder protection through carefully drawn pre-
emptive rights provisions. As stated by a leading writer on close
corporation law:
Most of the considerations that justify the elimination of preemptive
rights in publicly-held corporations do not apply to closely-held
corporations, at least not to those with a simple share structure...
[S]hareholders in a close corporation are usually vitally interested
in maintaining their proportionate control and their proportionate
interest in dividends and assets. A shareholder's interest in a closely-
held corporation is likely to be proportionately greater than the
individual interest of a shareholder in a publicly-held corporation
S. . Control is more important to a shareholder in a closely-held
corporation ... because control ... often means employment, and
the loss of control may result in a termination of employment...
[I]f the business prospers, its growth is likely to be due largely to
the energy and skill of its shareholders. Therefore, they should be
in a position to purchase new shares of the corporation's stock and
thus share in its expansion and prosperity. 6
25. 1 MODEL BusINEss CoRPoRAnoN ACT ANNOTATED §§ 6.30(b)(4), (5) (1988) (possible
statutory clarification of preemptive rights entitlement in a multi-class stock corporation is set
forth). See also 1 F. O'NEA. & R. THOMPSON, O'NEAL's CLoSE CORPORATIONS § 3.39 (3d Ed.
1986).
26. 1 F. O'NEa. & R. THOMPSON, supra note 25 at § 339.
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In order to protect the justified expectations of shareholders in
closely held and statutory close corporations, therefore, lawyers should
consider the following matters when drafting the constitutive cor-
porate documents.
1. Authorized Shares
It is normally advisable to limit the number of a corporation's
authorized shares to those that will in fact be issued at the time of
incorporation. The lack of authorized but unissued shares, which can
be issued by the board of directors without shareholder approval,
protects shareholders against the subsequent dilution of their interests.
To issue additional shares in the future, the board of directors must
obtain shareholder approval for an appropriate amendment to the
articles of incorporation, a requirement that can be subjected to a
super-majority voting requirement.27 The newly authorized shares can
and should be subjected to the shareholders' preemptive rights.
Sometimes, however, good reasons exist for authorizing more
shares than will be initially issued. Perhaps it is foreseeable that
additional capital will be required, for example, and the organizers
want to avoid the necessity of having to amend the articles of
incorporation. As mentioned above, such authorized but unissued
shares are normally not within the preemptive rights doctrine. To
protect shareholders under these circumstances, it is essential that
the preemptive rights provision in the articles of incorporation (or in
the shareholders' agreement) specify that shareholders have such a
right with respect to newly authorized shares.
2. Reacquired Shares
Closely held and statutory close corporations normally use first-
option transfer restrictions which require a shareholder who wants
to sell his shares to offer them first to the corporation or to the
other shareholders before they can be sold to anyone else. Similarly,
27. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text (Section III discusses super-majority
voting requirements).
28. See infra notes 62-107 and accompanying text (Section VI discusses first-option transfer
restrictions).
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such corporations often employ buy-out agreements29 under which
the shares of a deceased or retiring shareholder must be purchased
by the corporation or by the other shareholders. The acquisition by
a corporation of its own shares as a result of these devices poses a
potential threat to the remaining shareholders since the reissuance of
such shares can result in drastic reallocations of proportionate own-
ership interests. Reaquired shares are not subject to the traditional
common law preemptive fights rule. Unless specific directions as to
the cancellation or reissuance of reaquired shares are included in the
transfer restriction provision or in the buy-out agreement, it is crucial
that the preemptive rights provision be made expressly applicable to
the reissuance of reacquired shares.
Shares reacquired by a corporation are normally referred to as
"treasury shares." In California, however, the concept of treasury
shares has been statutorily abolished. Under section 510(a) of the
California Corporations Code, when a corporation "purchases, re-
deems, acquires by way of conversion to another class or series, or
otherwise acquires its own shares, those shares are restored to the
status of authorized but unissued shares, unless the articles prohibit
the reissuance thereof.''30 Thus, shares reacquired by a California
corporation which are allowed to be reissued are technically included
in a preemptive rights provision which applies to originally authorized
but unissued shares. For the sake of clarity, however, it is advisable
to provide specifically that reacquired shares are subject to preemptive
rights, if that is desired, since the persons deciding on their reissuance
are normally not cognizant of the legal classification of such shares.
3. Shares Issued for Non-Cash Consideration
A provision extending preemptive rights to originally authorized
but unissued shares and to treasury shares still offers only partial
protection to shareholders. As already mentioned, only shares issued
for cash are subject to preemptive rights. Shareholder interests can
still be diluted if the corporation issues additional shares in exchange
for property, services or in payment of a corporate debt. For max-
imum shareholder protection, the preemptive rights provision should
provide that shares can only be issued as consideration in a non-cash
29. See infra notes 108-123 and accompanying text (Section VII discusses buy-out agree-
ments).
30. CAL. CORP. CODE § 510(a) (%Vest Supp. 1989).
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transaction if the property or services are not obtainable for cash
and are truly needed by the corporation, or in the case of a debt
payment, that the debt instrument requires the issuance of shares as
payment for the debt.
4. Stock Option or Purchase Plans
Section 408 of the California Corporations Code authorizes cor-
porations to adopt stock option and stock purchase plans for its
employees and directors." An all-embracing preemptive rights pro-
vision might become an obstacle to the adoption and implementation
of such incentive plans in future years. Consideration should therefore
be given to drafting the preemptive rights provision in such a way
as to allow the corporation to issue shares for an incentive plan free
from preemptive rights. If necessary, a separate provision could be
added requiring a super-majority vote of the board of directors for
the adoption of an incentive plan. As an alternative, the adoption
of an employee stock option or purchase plan could be subjected to
the requirement of shareholder approval as well as board approval.
In short, careful consideration of the above discussed matters will
protect shareholders from this dilution of their interest in the cor-
poration and will preserve flexibility in the corporation for obtaining
financing when needed.
V. SHARE TRANSFER PROEmBITIONS AND CONSENT RESTRAINTS
A. In General
To a large extent, the success of a small business depends upon
the existence of harmonious relationships among its participants.
Agreement among the participants on the operations and goals of
the business is a necessary ingredient of that harmony. It is therefore
not at all surprising that the shareholders of closely held and statutory
close corporations, especially those who are actively engaged in
running the business on a daily basis, wish to have control over who
is allowed, by virtue of share ownership, to become a member of
the enterprise in future years. To the extent that this concern is based
31. Id. § 408 (West Supp. 1989).
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on the desire to allow only individuals possessed of specialized
expertise, skills or education to join the business, this can be accom-
plished, as already mentioned,32 by adopting a requirement imposing
specific qualifications upon shareholder status.
It is somewhat difficult, however, to devise pragmatically mean-
ingful ways of assuring present shareholders protection against such
amorphous qualities as obstreperousness, laziness, arrogance, lack of
common sense or any of the myriad of other human foibles that can
quickly poison an amicable working atmosphere in a business organ-
ization. To prevent individuals who possess undesirable qualities, or
lack desirable ones, from becoming shareholders in the future is thus
an important yet difficult task in the closely held and statutory close
corporation.
An additional concern is the objective of preventing the number
of participants from increasing beyond desirable or permissible limits.
Thus,* statutory close corporation status is lost if a legally effective
transfer increases the number of shareholders in the corporation to
more than the maximum number specified in the articles of incor-
poration;33 Subchapter S tax treatment is lost if a transfer increases
the number of shareholders beyond thirty-five.34 The goal of keeping
the closely held corporation closely held, the statutory close corpo-
ration close, and both of them harmonious requires that a method
be used to limit the ability of all shareholders to sell or otherwise
transfer shares to whomever they please.
One aspect of traditional American corporation law presents an
obstacle to the attainment of that goal. Rightly or wrongly, wisely
or not, corporate shares have been cast into the common law mold
of "personal property" and have thus been endowed with the sanctity
of unfettered alienability.35 Thus, every shareholder has the right to
transfer his shares to anyone, and some early cases invalidated
restrictions imposed on that right by characterizing them as unrea-
sonable restraints on alienation of personal property.3 6 Free aliena-
32. See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text (Section II discusses provisions for special
shareholder qualifications).
33. CAL. CORP. CODE § 158(c) (West Supp. 1989).
34. I.R.C. § 1371 (1989).
35. See W. PAINTER, COPORATE AND TAx ASPECTS OF CLOSELY HELD CORPORATION 107-
109 (2d Ed. 1981) (an expression of the view that to regard restrictions on the right to transfer
corporate shares as restraints on alienation and therefore undesirable or prohibited is an
unrealistic, unwise and unnecessarily analytical approach).
36. See Annotation, Construciton and Application of Provisions of Articles, By-Laws,
Statutes, or Agreements, or Agreements Restricting Alienation or Transfer of Corporate Stock,
2 A.L.R. 2d 745 (1948).
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bility of corporate shares is, of course, an absolute necessity from
the viewpoint of an investor in a publicly held corporation. As one
court has pointed out:
The purpose or reason underlying the policy favoring transferability
of certificates reflecting corporate ownership is fundamental to our
economic system. In theory and in practice, we are a commercial
nation comprised of individuals who trade among themselves under
a competitive, free-enterprise system. Certificates reflecting corpo-
rate ownership, even in close corporations . . . are a part of our
commerce. Our laws abound with provisions which favor corpora-
tions and dealings in corporate securities and certificates. Indeed
corporate certificates have become almost as negotiable as legal
tender.
3 7
From the viewpoint of the closely held and statutory close cor-
poration, however, the free alienability of shares is more in the
nature of an Achilles' heel. Luckily the traditional flexibility of the
common law has once again provided a workable accommodation.
The fiat against the restriction on the alienability of corporate shares
has, through an evolutionary process, been changed into a prohibition
of only those restraints which are unreasonable. As a consequence,
the increasing use of the corporate form by small enterprises has
been accompanied by the search for share transfer restrictions which
are reasonable and therefore enforceable. 8
B. The California Statute
The California Corporations Code provides that the articles of
incorporation may impose "(r)easonable restrictions upon the right
to transfer or hypothecate shares . . ."9 A provision to this effect
may be included in the bylaws. 40 A reasonable transfer restriction
may also be included in a shareholders' agreement executed by the
shareholders of a statutory close corporation. 4' The existence of a
transfer restriction must be conspicuously noted on the share certif-
icates. 42
37. Goldblum v. Boyd, 341 So. 2d 436, 448 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977).
38. W. PARINER, supra note 35, at 110-11: ".... so-called first option or first refusal
type restrictions, giving an option to purchase the stock upon the happening of a specified
condition, have been upheld if 'reasonable.' A survey of the cases indicates that nearly all
restrictions of the latter type have been held reasonable.. ." Id.
39. CA. CORP. CODE § 204(b) (West Supp. 1989).
40. Id. § 212(b)(1) (West Supp. 1989).
41. Id. § 300(b) (West Supp. 1989). See Note, Separate Statutory Treatment of the Close
Corporation in California: Progress and Problems, 27 HAsnlxos L.J. 433, 458-63 (1975).
42. CAL. CORP. CODE § 418(a)(1) (vest Supp. 1989).
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There is no statutory definition or guideline as to what constitutes
a "reasonable" share transfer restriction. In a relatively recent Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court case involving the validity of a first-option
transfer restriction contained in the corporation's bylaws, the court
set forth the following criteria and reasoning:
The term "reasonable" imports a twofold requirement. The bylaw
must not constitute an unreasonably restrictive curtailment of the
right of alienation . . ., and it must not otherwise unreasonably
deprive the shareholder of "substantial rights."
Bylaws restricting transfer in a close corporation are frequently
essential to a successful enterprise; they perform an important
function in precluding unwanted intrusion by outsiders; they pre-
serve the integrity of the functioning entity.
In the light of the legitimate interests to be furthered by the
bylaw, [the shareholder's] asserted right [to free alienation] becomes
"innocuous and insubstantial." ... The bylaw merely proscribes
[the shareholder's] choice of transferees while insuring to her the
price and terms equal to those offered by the outsider.
43
Basically, therefore, the "reasonableness" of a share transfer restric-
tion depends upon a balancing of the public policy favoring the free
flow of corporate securities against the more recently developed policy
which seeks to accommodate the special needs of closely held and
statutory close corporations.
Although lawyers tend to turn automatically to the first-option
transfer restriction, it is not the only device that may be available.
Absolute transfer prohibitions as well as so-called consent restrictions,
used within strict limits, may be considered as reasonable transfer
restrictions at times. A brief look at the judicial reaction to the
various kinds of transfer restrictions, and the lessons to be gleaned
therefrom by the drafter, is therefore in order to establish the
probable parameters of this statutorily permissible device.
C. Transfer Prohibitions
The validity of a transfer prohibition is determined by its reason-
ableness under common law corporation law principles" as well as
the California statute. 45 Although virtually all of the relatively few
43. Tu-Vu Drive-In Corporation v. Ashkins, 61 Cal. 2d 283, 286-87, 391 P.2d 828, 830,
38 Cal. Rptr. 348, 350 (1964).
44. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORMAIONs 758 (3d ed. 1983).
45. CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(b) (West Supp. 1989).
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cases involving the validity of absolute transfer prohibitions declared
them invalid as unreasonable restraints on alienation, 46 there is sup-
port for the proposition that such a prohibition, if imposed for a
specifically limited and relatively short period of time should be
upheld if adopted for a legitimate business purpose or need which is
reasonable under all of the surrounding factual circumstances. 47 For
example, if the participants in a newly organized corporation rely
simply on the protection afforded by a first-option transfer restric-
tion, they run the risk that an exercise of the option to buy shares
from a shareholder who wants to liquidate his investment in the first
or second year of the corporation's existence will not be possible
because of the lack of financial resources on the part of the option
holder. Consequently, the shareholder desiring to sell would be free
to sell to an outsider. Therefore, it may be advisable to adopt an
absolute transfer prohibition which would terminate at the end of
the first or second year of the corporation's existence.
There seems to be no judicial precedent clearly validating an
absolute transfer prohibition. However, two New York decisions
have upheld provisions which were equivalent to absolute transfer
restrictions in a closely held corporation setting.48 In the first case,
the court upheld a restriction upon shares of stock which were
transferred by the corporation to two inventors of a machine in
exchange for their invention. 49 The restriction provided that the stock
was to be held jointly and was inalienable for ten years unless both
shareholders consented to a transfer. In the second case, the court
upheld an agreement whereby the promoters of a corporation placed
a specified number of share certificates in trust for six months, the
shares remaining in trust unless all promoters consented in writing
to a withdrawal of the shares.5 ° It is important to emphasize that in
each of the two cases the court noted that the purpose of the transfer
restriction was to place the shareholders on an equal footing as to
control and that the agreement was made for the benefit of all
parties. 51 Thus, if unusual circumstances call for the utilization of an
46. See Annotation, Validity of Restrictions by Corporation on Alienation or Transfer of
Corporate Stock, 65 A.L.R. 1159 (1930), 61 A.L.R. 2d 1318 (1958); Annotations, Validity of
Restrictions on Alienation or Transfer of Corporate Stock, 53 A.L.R. 3d 1272 (1973).
47. 2 F. O'NEA, & R. THompSON, supra note 25 at § 7.06; Hornstein, Judicial Tolerance
of the Incorporated Partnership, 1 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 435, 447 (1953).
48. Hey v. Dolphin, 36 N.Y.S. 627 (1895); Williams v. Montgomery, 148 N.Y. 519, 43
N.E. 57 (1896).
49. Hey, 36 N.Y.S. at 632-33.
50. Williams, at 148 N.Y. at 519-20, 43 N.E. at 57-58.
51. Id. at 521, 43 N.E. at 59; Hey, 36 N.Y.S. at 631.
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absolute transfer restriction, the drafter should identify with precision
the purpose to be served, thereby supplying a potential basis for
judicial validation in case of litigation. An absolute transfer prohi-
bition should also be of very short duration.
In addition to the limitations applicable to transfer prohibitions
under general corporation law just discussed, a corporation that must
file an application for qualification by permit52 with the Commissioner
of Corporations for the issuance of its shares faces an additional
hurdle. The Corporate Securities Rules provide that a provision which
absolutely prohibits the transfer of securities will only be permitted
in unusual circumstances.. 3 While not giving any specific guidelines,
Corporate Securities Rule 260.140 provides a general criterion:
A variation from the standards stated in this Article wili be granted
at the request of the applicant in the case of a limited offering
qualification if it is possible to find that the offer and sale will not
be unfair, unjust or inequitable to the initial purchasers upon the
basis of all of the facts and circumstances of the case.
54
Thus, the use of a transfer prohibition for a reasonable purpose and
a limited time period would have to meet the criterion of Rule
260.140.
D. Consent Restraints
Provisions which make a shareholder's ability to transfer his shares
conditional on obtaining the consent of the corporation's board of
directors, or of a specified number of its shareholders, or of a
specified percentage of its outstanding shares have often been declared
invalid by American courts as unreasonable restraints on alienation. 55
However, the more recent trend towards judicial recognition of the
special needs of closely held corporations has yielded a growing
number of cases in which such consent restraints have been held
valid and enforceable.5 6 In a number of cases courts have expressly
52. "It is unlawful for any person to offer or sell in this state any security in an issuer
transaction ... unless such sale has been qualified ... " CAL. CoRP. CODE § 25110 (West
1977).
53. 10 CAL. CODE R as. § 260.140.8 (1989).
54. Id. § 260.140 (1989).
55. Numerous cases are cited in W. PA=R, supra note 35, at 110, n. 10 and 2 F.
O'NEAL & R. THo~msoN, supra note 25, at § 7.08 n. 2.
56. See, e.g., Schaffer v. Below, 278 F.2d 619 (3d Cir. 1960); Mason v. Mallard Tel.
Co., 213 Iowa 1076, 240 N.W. 671 (1932); Colbert v. Hennessey, 351 Mass. 131, 217 N.E.2d
914 (1966); Gray v. Harris Land & Cattle Co., 737 P.2d 475 (Montana 1987); Ling & Co. v.
Trinity Savings & Loan Ass'n, 482 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1972).
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stated that the desire of exerting control over who becomes a share-
holder of a closely held corporation is a reasonably necessary char-
acteristic of that type of corporation which justifies a subordination
of the policy against restraints on alienation.5 7 Some cases have
upheld the validity of -consent restraints where the language of the
restrictive provision provided protection against the unreasonable or
arbitrary withholding of consent, 58 or where such protection was
provided de facto.59 The fact that a consent restraint will be upheld
only if it is a reasonable restraint points out once again the need to
set forth in clear terms the purpose for which it is imposed.
A corporation that must file an application for qualification by
permit6° with the Commissioner of Corporations for the issuance of
its shares is limited, beyond the general corporation factor just
discussed, by the California Corporate Securities Rules which provide
that a consent restraint will not be approved except in unusual
circumstances. 61 As quoted above, Rule 260.140 indicates that an
exception may be made if the existence of such a consent restraint
would not be unfair, unjust or inequitable to the initial purchaser of
the shares.
VI. FRsT-OPTTON TIRANSFER RESTRICTIONS
Without question, the most pervasively used transfer restriction in
the closely held and statutory close corporation setting is the so-
called first-option, or right of first refusal, restriction. Unlike the
previously discussed transfer prohibition and consent restraint, which
involve the potential of a shareholder being prevented from selling
his shares, the first-option transfer restriction merely controls who
the buyer of the shares will be. It basically provides that a shareholder
who wants to sell his shares must first offer them to a specified
buyer, usually the corporation or the other shareholders. Only if that
specified option holder decides not to purchase the proffered shares
57. See, e.g., Mason v. Mallard Tel. Co., 213 Iowa 1076, 240 N.W. 671 (1932); Longyear
v. Hardman, 219 Mass. 405, 106 N.E. 1012 (1914); Fayard V. Fayard, 293 So. 2d 421 (Miss.
1974); Wright v. Iredell Tel. Co., 182 N.C. 308, 108 SE. 744 (1921).
58. Rafe v. Hindin, 29 App. Div. 2d 481, 288 N.Y.S.2d 662, aff'd. 23 N.Y.2d 759, 296
N.Y.S.2d 955, 244 N.E.2d 469 (1968).
59. Carlson v. Ringgold County Mutual Tel. Co., 252 Iowa 748, 108 N.W. 2d 478 (1961);
In Re West Waterway Lumber Co., 59 Wash. 2d 310, 367 P.2d 807 (1962). Cf. Mowatt v.
1540 Lake Shore Drive, 385 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1967).
60. See supra note 52.
61. 10 CAL. CODE RErS. § 260.140.8 (1989).
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is the shareholder free to sell them to anyone else. Drafting a properly
comprehensive option transfer restriction involves many considera-
tions which will be addressed in the following sections.
A. Location of Restriction
A first-option transfer restriction may be included either in the
articles of incorporation,62 in the bylaws,
63 or in a shareholders'
agreement.64 Prevalent California practice apparently is to include
such a provision either in a shareholders' agreement or in the bylaws
rather than in the articles of incorporation.
65
B. Purpose Clause
As is the case with other types of transfer restrictions, a first-
option restriction is only valid and enforceable if it is reasonable.
The case law dealing with the reasonableness of transfer restrictions,
in balancing the need for such protection against the public policy
against restraints on alienation, has consistently emphasized the rel-
evance of the purpose for which a transfer restriction is adopted.
6
It is therefore important that the drafter express with reasonable
detail the function of the transfer restriction in the particular factual
setting in which it used. Thus, statements indicating that the restric-
tion is for the purpose of maintaining a particular share ownership
pattern, or of allowing only persons with special expertise to become
shareholders, or to maintain harmony and compatibility among the
shareholders, joined with an expressed objective of thereby serving
the best interests of the corporation, should be set forth in the
purpose clause. While obviously not conclusive on the issue of
reasonableness, the presence of a well-drawn purpose clause can be
62. CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(b) (West Supp. 1989).
63. Id. § 212(b)(1) (West Supp. 1989).
64. Id. § 300(b) (West Supp. 1989).
65. The long-standing practice to keep articles of incorporation as simple and short as is
legally permissible is partially based on the Secretary of State's authority under California
Corporations Code section I10(a) to refuse to file a submitted document if it does not conform
to law. CAL. CoRP. CODE § 110(a) (vest 1977). Since share transfer restrictions are only valid
if "reasonable," potential differences of opinion as to what constitutes the required reasona-
bleness can initially be avoided by putting such restrictions in documents that do not have to
be filed with the Secretary of State.
66. W. PAn rnE, supra note 35, at 113.
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of valuable assistance to a court facing that issue in subsequent
litigation.
C. Scope of Transfer Restriction
Many a transfer restriction of the type under discussion has failed
to provide subsequent protection because insufficient attention was
devoted in the drafting stage to the question of its intended scope
of application. A transfer restriction which by its terms gives a first-
option to the corporation to buy the shares of a shareholder in case
of a proposed "sale" has been held not to prevent that shareholder
from transferring the shares through a testamentary bequest free of
the restriction.6 7 In addition to the need to make first-option transfer
restrictions applicable to all testamentary transfers, whether by a
specific or a residual bequest, transfers resulting from intestacy should
also be included. And in the area of inter vivos transfers, the specific
applicability of the transfer restriction to such potential events as
gifts, pledges of shares and sales of pledged shares by the pledgee,
and transfers in connection with bankruptcy proceedings, should be
covered by express language to avoid the need for future litigation.
Another consideration in determining the appropriate scope of a
first-option transfer restriction is whether the objective of the pro-
vision is to keep outsiders from becoming shareholders or to maintain
a proportionate voting control allocation. In case of the former, the
transfer restriction can be made applicable only to proposed transfers
to non-shareholders; in case of the latter, the provision should be
made applicable to all proposed transfers.
D. Choosing the Option Holder or Holders
Obligating a shareholder who wants to transfer his shares to offer
them first to the corporation before he can transfer them to someone
else is, in one sense, potentially incomplete protection. The ability
of a corporation to make such a purchase is not only dependent
upon the availability of sufficient cash at the time the option is to
be exercised but is also subject to the existence of the statutorily
specified financial condition6s prescribed for corporate distributions
67. Glenn v. Seaview Country Club, 380 A.2d 1175, 1177 (N.J. Super. 1977).
68. CAL. CORP. CODE § 501 (West Supp. 1989).
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to shareholders. 9 If either of these two prerequisites is lacking, the
corporation is not permitted to purchase its own shares and the
shareholder is free to transfer his shares to whomever he wishes.
Within limits, of course, precautionary measures can and should
be taken to give reasonable assurance that the corporate treasury will
have sufficient funds on hand to exercise an option at the appropriate
time. Thus, a sinking fund can be established to which a specified
sum or percentage of corporate income is deposited annually. The
available balance in such a fund is subject to the vagaries of the
corporation's financial success, especially in the early years of its
existence. Nevertheless, a sinking fund offers some potential protec-
tion as well as an opportunity to accumulate a limited amount of
corporate earnings without, it is hoped, running afoul of the accu-
mulated earnings tax.70 Additional assurance of having sufficient
funds available to purchase shares can be obtained by having the
corporation take out life insurance on its shareholders so that the
policy proceeds can be used by the corporation to purchase the shares
of a deceased shareholder. 71 While these two devices may serve to
cure, or at least ameliorate, the potential problem of a lack of ready
cash, there remains the unavoidable risk that the corporation has
neither sufficient retained earnings72 nor the required ratio of assets
to liabilities73 to permit a repurchase of shares.
Attempting to avoid this potential dilemma by giving the option
to the other shareholders, rather than to the corporation, avoids the
legal restraints imposed upon corporations in the purchase of their
own shares, but creates a new problem. While individual shareholders
are under no statutory limitation with respect to the money used to
purchase another shareholder's shares, they may be under the prag-
matic limitation of an empty wallet. This can be an especially serious
problem if some shareholders can, and others cannot, exercise their
option, thus giving rise to a potential restructuring of the previously
existing voting structure in the corporation.
69. Id. § 166 (West Supp. 1989).
70. See I.R.C. §§ 531-535 (1988). See also B. BrrTKER & J. EUSTACE, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATiON OF CoRpoRATioNs AND SELAREHoLDERs § 8.07 (5th ed. 1987).
71. While the ability of a corporation to insure the lives of its employees and shareholders
is limited by the traditional requirement that it must have an insurable interest in the life of
the insured, the relative importance of each individual in a closely held or statutory close
corporation, whether employee and shareholder or just shareholder, should suffice to satisfy
that prerequisite.
72. CAL. CORP. CODE § 500(a) (West Supp. 1989).
73. Id. § 500(b) (West Supp. 1989).
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There simply is no way to give absolute assurance that a first-
option transfer restriction will in fact result in the attainment of the
desired and needed protection for shareholders. In order to reduce
the chances of the designated optionee's inability to exercise the
option, many lawyers draft transfer restrictions which give successive
options so that the shareholder can only transfer his shares to an
outsider if both the corporation and the shareholders fail to exercise
their respective options. While this gives maximum potential protec-
tion to the corporation and to the shareholders collectively, the price
paid is a potential increase in the time consumed in settling the
matter of whether the shareholder who wants to transfer his shares,
often in as speedy a manner as possible, can do so and to whom.
E. Partial Exercise of Option
A potential problem that should not be left unresolved is the
question of whether the designated optionee of a first-option transfer
restriction must exercise the option in full, if at all, or whether a
partial exercise of the option is permissible. That matter can assume
large dimensions since the specified purchase could, under the right
circumstances, leave the selling shareholder with a minority interest
which would be difficult to dispose of if the purchaser could retain
or acquire majority control by merely partially exercising the option.
F. Option Period
Time is often of the essence to a shareholder who wants to sell
his shares, and for his protection, the time period given to the
designated optionee for the exercise of the option should be limited.
In fairness to the corporation or the other shareholders holding the
option, the period should be sufficiently long to allow making the
necessary financial arrangements. Option periods of up to ninety
days have been impliedly found reasonable in cases litigated in other
states. 74 The California Commissioner of Corporations seemingly
frowns upon option periods which substantially exceed thirty days. 75
74. Data Consultants, Inc. v. Traywick, 593 F. Supp. 447, 456 (D. Md. 1983), aff'd 742
F.2d 1448 (4th Cir. 1984); Cimo v. National Motor Club of Louisiana, Inc., 237 So. 2d 408,
413 (La. Ct. App. 1970).
75. No specific written policy has been adopted by the Commissioner of Corporations.
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Thus for corporations whose first-option transfer restriction will be
scrutinized by that administrative agency under the California secu-
rities law provisions, a total option period beyond thirty days is
probably only permissible in the case of successive options to the
corporation and the other shareholders.
G. Disposition of Purchased Shares
The acquisition by a corporation of its own shares raises the
problem of what will happen to those shares. If the corporation's
board of directors is free to issue them again, a control allocation
problem may arise. For example, if those acquired shares are sold
to one of the remaining shareholders, that purchaser's proportionate
voting power is increased and this may result in a shift of majority
control.
Shares reacquired by a corporation legally revert to the status of
authorized but unissued shares under Section 510(a) of the California
Corporations Code and thus are subject to subsequent issuance by
the board of directors unless otherwise restricted. 76 It is therefore
advisable to provide that such reacquired shares must be cancelled
or that they are to be offered to the remaining shareholders pro rata
on the basis of preemptive rights.
H. Purchase Price-In General
Without doubt the most difficult part of devising a first-option
transfer restriction is the selection of an appropriate pricing formula.
Since the potential exercise of the option will occur at an unspecified
time in the future, no reliable information is available at the time
of organizing the corporation that would indicate the future value
of the shares. It is obviously inadvisable to leave the matter of the
purchase price unresolved and subject to negotiation at the time of
the purchase since the selling shareholder is not normally in a
Secondary authority, apparently based on informal observations, is contradictory. See e.g. 1
H. MARSH & R. VOLK, PRACTICE UNDER THE CALIFoRNIA SECuR~s LAWS § 8.02(k)(iv) (1988)
(the old 30-day limit has been replaced by a more flexible standard that may permit option
periods for 60 or even 90 days depending upon the particular circumstances of the involved
corporation). But see W. PAINTER, supra note 35, at 128 ("current [California] administrative
practice ... indicates that a restriction will ordinarily be considered objectionable if its total
duration substantially exceeds 30 days.").
76. CAL. CORP. CODE § 510(a) (West Supp. 1989).
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favorable bargaining position. A pricing formula should, therefore,
be incorporated in the transfer restriction provision. A surprisingly
large number of different pricing methods have been utilized in the
past. As will be seen in the subsequent pages, however, many of the
theoretically available methods have pragmatic drawbacks or face
legal hurdles, especially in the wake of the impact of the California
Corporate Securities Law of 1968.
77
I. Purchase Price-Securities Law Impact
Occasionally cited cases suggest that a first-option transfer restric-
tion will be judicially enforced even though the price realized by the
selling shareholder is substantially below the shares' market value.
7
1
Whatever vitality such cases may have in the realm of general
corporation law, their impact has been substantially reduced as a
result of California securities law provisions which are applicable to
many small corporations. The specific applicability of these provisions
can be summarized as follows:
1. Exempt Close Corporations
A corporation which is eligible, in accordance with the criteria of
section 25102(f) or (h) of the California Corporations Code79 and
the pertinent Corporate Securities Rules,80 for an exemption from
the qualification requirement for the issuance of its shares, is subject
only to general corporation law concepts with respect to first-option
transfer restriction pricing methods.
2. Qualifying Corporations-Charter Document Restriction
A corporation which is not an "exempt close corporation" and
which therefore must qualify the issuance of its shares with the
Commissioner of Corporations81 is subject, with respect to the per-
77. 1968 Cal. Stats. ch. 88, sec. 2, at 243, (enacting CAL. CoRP. CODE 33 25000-25220).
78. See, e.g., In re Estate of Brown, 130 IU. App. 2d 514, 264 N.E.2d 287 (1970); Allen
v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 141 N.E.2d 812, 161 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1957); Renberg
v. Zarrow, 687 P.2d 465 (Okla. 1983).
79. CA.. CoRP. CODE § 25102(f), (h) (West Supp. 1989).
80. 10 CAL. CODE RIGS., §§ 260.102.4-260.102.14 (1989).
81. CAL. CoRP. CODE § 25110 (West 1977).
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missibility of a pricing formula, to Corporate Securities Rule
260.140.882 if the transfer restriction is contained in any of the
corporation's charter documents. Rule 260.140.8 provides:
No open qualifications will be approved to issue securities the
transfer of which is subject to any restrictions imposed by the
charter documents of the issuer or the indenture or other instrument
pursuant to which the securities are issued. Limited offering quali-
fications may be approved for the issuance of securities subject to
such restrictions, provided they are not of such a nature as to
unfairly prejudice the opportunity of the holder to realize a reason-
able price for his securities. Provisions which base the price at
which the corporation or the other shareholders may purchase the
securities, in the event of a desire to sell by the holder, upon the
offer received from a third party, upon the appraised value of the
securities, or upon the book value (except in the case of a type of
business where book value is not a significant indication of the
value of the securities) are presumptively reasonable. Provisions
which base the price upon the par value or original purchase price
... will only be permitted in unusual circumstances.8
Charter documents, in addition to the articles of incorporation and
the bylaws, include a shareholders' agreement executed by all of the
shareholders of a statutory close corporation; a shareholders' agree-
ment executed by shareholders of a closely held corporation is not
considered a charter document. 84
3. Qualifying Corporations-Private Agreement Restriction
A first-option pricing provision contained in a private agreement,
rather than in a charter document, is technically not subject to the
criteria of Corporate Securities Rule 260.140.8, if that rule is con-
strued grammatically. However, a private agreement containing a
transfer restriction, such as a shareholders' agreement executed by
shareholders of a closely held corporation, must be submitted to the
Commissioner of Corporations as a required exhibit to the application
for the qualification of securities by permit.8 5 The price formula in
the transfer restriction thus comes under the Commissioner's scrutiny
for the purpose of determining whether the proposed issuance of
82. 10 CA. CODE REGS. § 260.140.8 (1989).
83. Id.
84. Id. § 260.001 (1989).
85. Id. 260.113 (1989).
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securities is "fair, just and equitable' "1 6 -an examination which is
more than likely to focus on whether the initial purchaser of the
securities is given the opportunity to realize a reasonable price when
he has to offer them to the transfer restriction option holder at a
later date.
J. Purchase Price-Third Party Offer
A provision requiring the corporation or the other shareholders
purchasing shares under a first-option transfer restriction to match
the price which the selling shareholder has been offered by a third
party will, in the absence of collusion, generally tend to generate a
purchase price which reasonably approximates the economic value of
the shares. This pricing method is presumptively reasonable under
California securities law.
87
The major problem with such a pricing formula, however, is a
practical one. It requires the existence of a third party who is willing
to make a bona fide offer to purchase the shares. A shareholder
who wants to liquidate his investment but has no potential buyer is
in the unenviable position of either remaining locked into his invest-
ment, if the designated option holder does not want to buy the
shares, or of having to negotiate a purchase price with the option
holder from a weak bargaining position.
A slight variation of this pricing method that can be employed as
an alternative is to require a shareholder who wishes to sell his shares
to offer them to the specified option holder at the price for which
he is willing to sell them and that, if the option holder declines to
exercise the option, the shareholder is free to sell the shares to anyone
at that or a higher, but not a lower, price. The difference in the
procedural sequence, however, does not cure the pragmatic problem
that the potential market for the shares of a closely held or statutory
close corporation, especially for shares constituting a minority inter-
est, is a limited one.
K. Purchase Price-Appraisal
The pricing method which offers the greatest potential for a selling
shareholder to receive a fair price for his shares from the option
86. CAL. CoRP. CODE § 25140(b) (West 1977).
87. 10 CAL. CODE REGs. § 260.140.8 (1989).
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holder is the appraisal method, a method specified as a presumptively
reasonable price formula under California securities law."8 Typically,
an appraisal provision names who the appraisers shall be (in which
case a provision for choosing successors should be included) or
provides that the selling shareholder and the option holder shall each
designate one appraiser and the two so selected shall appoint a third
appraiser. To avoid future differences of opinion among the apprais-
ers regarding the standards to be employed in the appraisal process,8 9
the transfer restriction should set forth the applicable standards to
be employed-for example, whether corporate assets shall be valued
as they appear on the corporate books rather than at their market
value, whether good will is to be included in the appraisal, etc. In
addition to the problem of finding individuals qualified to appraise
corporate shares which have no active trading market, the financial
impact-which can be substantial-of appraisers' fees must be con-
sidered in selecting this pricing mechanism.
L. Purchase Price-Book Value
With respect to the use of book value as a pricing formula, it is
difficult to improve upon the following statement:
The method perhaps most frequently used is to set the price of
shares at their book value. This method's disarming appearance of
simplicity probably accounts for the frequency of its use. In some
respects, however, it is one of the most unsatisfactory ways of
determining the value of shares. 90
This potential unsatisfactoriness, discussed in more detail below,
explains why the California Corporate Securities Rules qualify the
presumptive reasonableness of book value pricing by limiting it to
situations where the business is of a type in which book value is a
significant indication of the value of the shares. 91
88. Id.
89. See Brown v. Allied Corrugated Box Co., 91 Cal. App. 3d 477, 154 Cal. Rptr. 170
(1979). Although occurring in an involuntary dissolution setting, Brown is a good illustration
of the extent to which appraisers can differ in the valuation of stock based upon the use of
different appraisal factors. Id. at 481, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 172-73. Of three court-appointed
appraisers, two agreed on a valuation of $27,195 for a minority shareholder's shares, while
the third appraiser filed a minority report with the court valuing the same shares at $147.596.
Id.
90. 2 F. O'NEAL & R. THompsoN, supra note 25, at § 7.30.
91. 10 CAL. CODE REos. § 260.140.8 (1989).
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The book value of the shares of a corporation having one class
of stock is determined by subtracting the corporation's liabilities
from its assets and dividing the resulting net worth by the number
of its outstanding shares. The nature of the business conducted by
the particular corporation as well as the way in which corporate
balance sheets are constructed make it likely that the book value of
corporate shares will not be closely related to their economic value.
For example, a corporation deriving its income and profits primarily
from performing services rather than manufacturing and selling prod-
ucts, may have little in the way of assets, and the book value of its
shares is not very likely to be reflective of its earnings potential. In
this type of situation, even case law precedent upholding the validity
of a first-option transfer restriction utilizing a book value price
formula92 is irrelevant for a qualifying corporation because this is
precisely the kind of setting in which the Commissioner of Corpo-
rations would deny a permit to issue the shares because that formula
would be employed in "a type of business where book value is not
a significant indication of the value of the securities." 93
Even if the particular corporation is not primarily a service-
rendering enterprise but one which has substantial tangible assets,
such as manufacturing equipment, buildings, inventory, etc., it is
highly questionable whether the value of these assets as carried on
the corporate books corresponds closely to their true economic value.
If prepared in accordance with "generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples" as required by statute,94 the balance sheet will generally carry
corporate assets at a valuation that is below the current market or
replacement value. For example, "generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples" require that inventory be carried at the lower of cost or
market value; corporate assets such as buildings or real property
which have increased in value cannot be "written up" on the cor-
porate books under the prohibition against the recognition of un-
realized appreciation. In addition, the depreciation of fixed assets,
especially under accelerated depreciation methods for tax purposes,
is likely to cause those assets to be listed on the corporate books at
understated economic values. Good will, an elusive figure at best,
will often be carried at either a nominal or an inflated figure that
does not truly reflect the earnings potential of the enterprise.
92. See, e.g. Vannucci v. Pedrini, 217 Cal. 138, 17 P.2d 706 (1932).
93. 10 CAL. CODE REGS. § 260.140.8 (1989).
94. CAL. CORP. CODE § 114 (West Supp. 1989).
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These potential discrepancies do not argue for the categorical
unsuitability of the book value formula in a first-option transfer
restriction, however. Instead, they stand as a challenge to the drafter
to write a pricing formula based on book value specifying with
sufficient detail and clarity that, for purposes of the transfer restric-
tion, certain types of assets shall be valued in a particular manner.
Thus, the provision can specifically require that certain corporate
assets shall be valued at replacement value and that other specified
assets shall be valued by taking unrealized appreciation into account.
With such preventive adjustment, book value pricing formulas can
be shaped to yield a fair price to the selling shareholder and to meet
the California securities law requirements of either Corporate Secu-
rities Rule 260.140.8 or of section 25140(b) of the California Cor-
porations Code. 91
Outside the realm of securities law limitations, use of a book value
pricing formula may be upheld under general corporation law prin-
ciples. For example, a California case, Yeng Sue Chow v. Levi
Strauss & Co.,96 using language drawn partially from a New York
case, stated that:
[A]ppellant's position is that this court should rewrite the option
contract so that it provide for the repurchase of corporate shares
at the market price rather than the agreed on book value of the
shares. This we cannot do.... [T]he overwhelming weight of
authority is to the effect that the validity of a restriction on transfer
does not rest on any abstract notion of intrinsic fairness of price.
To be invalid, more than mere disparity between the option price
and the current value of the stock must be shown. Since the
determination of the price for repurchase is a contractual matter
agreed upon by the parties, the court's scope of inquiry is limited
to testing the reasonableness of the price formula . . . [Tihe courts
can have no concern with the wisdom or folly of a contract, made
... without fraud where the parties are competent to contract and
enter into the same fairly and understandingly. The mere fact that
the property has increased or diminished since the contract was
concluded will not warrant a refusal to carry out its terms in the
absence of circumstances indicating fraud or bad faith. 97
95. "The Commissioner may refuse to issue a permit under Section 25113 unless he finds
that the proposed plan of business of the applicant and the proposed issuance of securities
are fair, just, and equitable .. ." CAL. CORP. CODE § 25140(b) (West 1977).
96. 49 Cal. App. 3d 315, 122 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1975).
97. Yeng Sue Chow, 49 Cal. App. 3d at 329, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 824-25.
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M. Purchase Price - Par Value; Original Purchase Price
Two pricing methods which have occasionally been used in first-
option transfer restrictions allow the designated option holder to
purchase the shares at their par value or at their original purchase
price. Apart from the fact that these pricing methods are simple and
yield a definite price, it is hard to imagine any other redeeming
value. The probability that a price so specified will bear any reason-
able relationship to the economic value of the shares at the time the
option is exercised is slim indeed, since it presumes that the business
is worth no more and no less than at the time of its incorporation.
Even if permissible, such a pricing formula should therefore only be
considered if the normal goal of a fair price to the selling shareholder
has been replaced or is outweighed by other considerations.
For "exempt close corporations" 98 the permissibility of using such
a pricing method depends only upon general corporation law con-
cepts. Surprisingly, a number of appellate decisions have upheld the
validity of such pricing formulas even where their application resulted
in a great disparity between the specified price and the economic
value of the shares. 99 For example, in one leading case the court
enforced a first-option transfer restriction which entitled the corpor-
ation's remaining shareholders to purchase, for $1 per share, shares
which were worth no less than $1,060 per share at the time of the
exercise of the option.100 The court emphasized that as long as the
parties had agreed to the formula knowingly, without overreaching,
fraud or deceit, a discrepancy between sale price and actual value
was irrelevant in view of the purpose of the restriction-to keep the
corporation close. Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals has
stated:
[T]he validity of the restriction on transfer does not rest on any
abstract notion of intrinsic fairness of price. To be invalid, more
than mere disparity between option price and current value of the
98. See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text (Section VI, discusses the impact of
securities law on purchase price restrictions for exempt close corporations).
99. See, e.g., Martin v. Graybar Electric Co., 285 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1961); Palmer v.
Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1951); Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y 2d 534, 161
N.Y.S.2d 418, 141 N.E.2d 812 (1957); In Re Mather's Estate, 410 Pa. 361, 189 A.2d 586
(1963).
100. Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 161 N.Y.S.2d 418, 141 N.E.2d 812
(1957).
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stock must be shown ... Since the parties have in effect agreed on
a price formula which suited them, and provision is made freeing
the stock for outside sale should the corporation not make, or
provide for, the purchase, the restriction is reasonable and valid.' 0
Although involving a book value pricing formula, a recent Cali-
fornia case expresses the same general attitude. 10 2 It is reasonable to
assume that the growing judicial recognition of the special nature
and needs of the closely held corporation, as exemplified in the
quotation above, could cause a court to validate such a pricing
formula under similar factual circumstances in California.
With respect to the use of such a pricing formula in a non-exempt,
qualifying corporation, 03 the situation is more complex. While subject
to the corporation law norm just discussed, such a corporation is
further limited by Corporate Securities Rule 260.140.8, which states
that "(p)rovisions which base the price upon the par value or original
purchase price ... will only be permitted in unusual circum-
stances."'1' 4 Given the protective nature of the substance and appli-
cation of California securities law, it is doubtful that the Commissioner
of Corporations would equate the general desire to keep close cor-
porations close, with the unusual circumstances specified in Rule
260.140.8. Some additional, more specific need for such a pricing
formula would probably have to be shown to obtain securities law
approval. A possible example of sufficiently unusual circumstances,
as described in the leading treatise on California securities law, might
be
the situation where securities are sold to an employee at a price
equal to par value or at market price pursuant to an agreement
wherein the employee commits to serve the employer for a given
period of time and, should the employee leave voluntarily prior to
the expiration of the agreed period of service, the employing cor-
poration has the right to repurchase the securities at the original
purchase price.os
A second possibility for obtaining approval of a par value or
original purchase price formula exists for a corporation which must
101. Id. at 543, 161 N.Y.S. at 424, 141 N.E.2d at 817.
102. See Yeng Sue Chow v. Levi Strauss & Co., 49 Cal. App. 3d 315, 122 Cal. Rptr. 816
(1975).
103. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text (Sections VI.I 2 and 3 discuss the impact
of securities law on purchase price restrictions for non-exempt, qualifying corporations).
104. 10 CAL. CODE REOS. § 260.140.8 (1989).
105. H. MAgsR & R. VoLK, PRACnCE UNDER r= CAxnioaRu SEcurRrs LAws 8-23 (1988).
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qualify the issuance of its shares. Even in the absence of unusual
circumstances, the Commissioner of Corporations may grant a var-
iation from the otherwise applicable standards "if it is possible to
find that the offer and sale will not be unfair, unjust or inequitable
to the initial purchasers upon the basis of all of the facts and
circumstances of the case. ' ' 106
N. Purchase Price-Periodically Fixed Price
The pricing mechanism, which calls for the periodic (usually an-
nual) formulation of the value of the corporation's shares, is neither
specifically mentioned in the Corporate Securities Rules as presump-
tively reasonable nor as only permissible under unusual circumstances.
Committed either to the board of directors, or to all of the share-
holders collectively, or to designated individuals or appraisers, the
price determination, based upon specified criteria, then remains in
effect until the next scheduled price adjustment and applies to all
purchases under the transfer restriction during that interval. Since
periodically adjusted prices are reasonably likely to reflect the fair
value of the shares, the formula should normally be approved under
both securities and general corporation law principles.
The practical problem with this kind of pricing formula is that all
too often the periodic price adjustment does not in fact take place,
sometimes not for a substantial number of years. The result is that
a shareholder who has to offer his shares to the corporation or to
the other shareholders is faced with an outdated price which must
now be revised under pressure of time, possibly when the selling
shareholder is not in a strong bargaining position, or when the
breakdown of amicable relationships in the enterprise may have an
adverse impact on the supposedly neutral process of price determi-
nation.
0. Purchase Price-Capitalization of Earnings
Also not specifically mentioned in the Corporate Securities Rules
as either presumptively reasonable, or as only permissible under
unusual circumstances, is the capitalization of earnings approach.
106. 10 CAL. CODE REGS., § 260.140 (1989).
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The underlying rationale of this valuation method is that the value
of a corporation's shares should be measured by its ability to earn
profits.
Capitalization of earnings is not a highly recommended valuation
technique for use in first-option transfer restrictions. The reasons for
this have been stated as follows:
In the first place, the drafting of provisions governing the calculation
of corporate earnings and providing for abnormal years, unusual
business conditions, and nonrecurring items of profit and loss is
extremely difficult. Secondly, in a representative closely held cor-
poration, since most profits are absorbed in salaries, corporate
books do not reflect the real earning power of the business. Thirdly,
withdrawal from the business of the shareholder whose shares are
being transferred may materially affect the corporation's earning
power ... Finally, capitalization of earnings is not a satisfactory
device for placing a price on shares transferred during the early
years of a corporation. Earnings during a corporation's first years
are usually not indicative of its ultimate earning power. 1°7
Of course, some of these factors may not always be applicable. For
example, if a sole proprietorship or a partnership with a relatively
long business history is being transformed into a corporation, the
previous profits of that enterprise may give a reasonably accurate
indication of future profits. The predicted future profits would be
expressive of the enterprise's true earning capacity, and adjustments
for salary payments could be expressly required in the valuation
formula.
The first-option transfer restrictions device discussed above protects
the corporation and its participants by conferring upon the specified
option holder a right, but not an obligation, to purchase the shares
of a shareholder who, for whatever reason, wants to dissociate
himself from the enterprise. From the viewpoint of each individual
shareholder, however, that device offers incomplete protection with
respect to those situations in which the shareholder may want assur-
ance that his shares will, rather than might, be purchased by the
corporation or the other shareholders. Often shareholders want as-
surance that their shares will be purchased at the time of their
retirement or upon their death. Such a mandatory purchase, of
course, also protects the corporation and the other shareholders by
preventing a sale of the shares to outsiders. It is therefore common
107. 2 F. O'NEA. & R. THOMPSON, supra note 25 at § 7.33.
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practice in closely held and statutory close corporations to execute
buy-out agreements which provide that the corporation or the re-
maining shareholders must purchase the shares of a fellow share-
holder upon the happening of specified events. Where a buy-out
agreement is decided upon, it is possible to incorporate into it a
first-option transfer restriction device, so that mandatory purchases




Agreements which require a corporation to purchase the shares of
a shareholder upon the happening of a specified event are often
referred to as "buy-out," "stock purchase," "stock retirement," or
"stock redemption" agreements. Agreements which require the other
shareholders to purchase the shares of a fellow shareholder upon the
happening of a specified event are usually referred to as "buy-sell"
or "cross-purchase" agreements. For the sake of simplicity the term
"buy-out" agreement will be used here to refer to both types of
agreement.
B. General Validity
Obligating a shareholder or his estate to sell shares upon the
occurrence of a specified event, while not a restraint on alienation
in the usual sense, is nevertheless a limitation on the choice of buyers.
In that sense, the buy-out agreement is a transfer restriction and,
under general corporation law principles, must be reasonable to be
valid and enforceable. As in the case of other types of transfer
restrictions, reasonableness is determined by reference to the purpose
of the restriction and all of the surrounding factual circumstances. 18
Buy-out agreements which obligate the estate of a deceased share-
holder to sell his shares have been consistently upheld as valid against
the charge that they are testamentary in character and therefore
108. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text (Section V.A. discusses the reasonableness
requirement for restrictions on alienability of corporate stock).
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invalid unless executed in compliance with the statutory requirements




C. California Securities Law Impact
1. Exempt Close Corporations
There is no securities law impact with respect to the utilization of
a buy-out agreement in connection with the issuance of shares by an
exempt close corporation." 0 The validity of the buy-out agreement
depends solely upon the general corporation law criteria mentioned
in the preceding paragraph. The shares issued by an exempt close
corporation cannot normally be transferred by the original purchaser
without the approval of the Commissioner of Corporations."' How-
ever, such transfers to the issuing corporation, or to other holders
of the same class of shares, are exempt from that approval require-
ment.112 Consequently, the buy-out provisions are not subject to the
Commissioner's approval authority either at the time of the original
issuance of the shares or at the time of the sale by the original
holder to the specified buyer in the buy-sell agreement.
2. Qualifying Corporations
Buy-out provisions, contained in a charter document of a corpo-
ration which must qualify the issuance of its shares, need the approval
of the Commissioner of Corporations." 3 Charter documents are the
articles of incorporation, the bylaws and, in the case of a statutory
close corporation, a shareholders' agreement.1
4 Apart from certain
considerations with respect to purchase price determination, discussed
below, the Corporate Securities Rules provide that provisions "which
give an option to the corporation or the other shareholders to
purchase regardless of the desire of the holder to sell" will be
permitted "for a limited time upon termination of employment in
109. See cases cited in 2 F. O'NEAL & R. Tnom, soN, supra note 25 at § 7.10, n. 8.
110. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text (Section VI.I.1 discusses the impact of
securities law on purchase price restrictions for exempt close corporations).
111. 10 CAL. CODE REaGS., § 260.141.11(b) (1989).
112. Id.
113. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25110 (West Supp. 1989).
114. 10 CAL. CODE REGs., § 260.001(a) (1989).
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the case of employees of the issuer, or for a limited time upon the
death of a holder."' 115 Since these are the two events which usually
constitute triggering events for buy-out arrangements, California
securities law seemingly poses no obstacles in this area. Beyond the
two specified situations, the Corporate Securities Rules provide that
buy-out provisions will only be permitted in unusual circumstances.116
Buy-out provisions contained in a private contractual agreement
rather than in a charter document, while not subject to the already
cited securities rule if the rule is construed grammatically, are nev-
ertheless subject to scrutiny by the Commissioner of Corporations
under Securities Rule 260.113117 if they specify the corporation as the
share purchaser. The application form which is filed by an applicant
for a permit to issue shares requires that a "copy of any contract
made or to be made by the issuer affecting ... transferability of
the securities" be attached to the application."8 The provisions of
such a contract thus come within the Commissioner's statutory
authority to refuse a permit if the proposed issuance of securities is
not "fair, just and equitable." 119 Similarly, buy-out provisions, con-
tained in a contractual agreement which specifies that the other
shareholders (rather than the corporation) are the share purchasers,
must be attached to the permit application 20 and are thus subject to
the same statutory approval criteria.
D. Location of Buy-Out Provisions
Buy-out provisions can be inserted in the articles of incorporation,
in the bylaws, or in a separate contractual agreement. Prevalent
practice is to incorporate such provisions in the shareholders' agree-
ment in a statutory close corporation and in a separate contractual
agreement in a closely held corporation. This practice is probably to
a large extent the result of concern on the part of practicing attorneys
that including such provisions in articles of incorporation subjects
them to the sometimes overly zealous scrutiny of the Secretary of
State's office.12' An additional reason is that protection afforded by
115. Id. § 260.140.8 (1989).
116. Id.
117. Id. at § 260.113 (1989).
118. Id. § 260.113, Item 21.C (West 1989).
119. CAL. CoRP. CODE § 25140(b) (West 1977).
120. 10 CAL. CODE REOS., § 260.113, Item 21.D (1989).
121. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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buy-out provisions contained in the articles of incorporation or in
the by-laws could conceivably be nullified by shareholders having
sufficient voting power to amend those corporate documents. While
super-majority voting requirements could be imposed to reduce or
eliminate such potential amendments, it is less cumbersome to utilize
a contractual agreement that is not subject to amendment without
the unanimous consent of the contracting parties. The scope and
complexity of a buy-out agreement also make it somewhat unwieldy
for inclusion in the articles of incorporation.
E. Purpose Clause
The validity of a buy-out agreement depends upon its reasonable-
ness. It is thus advisable to specify as succintly as possible the
purpose for which the agreement is adopted. A statement indicating
that the corporation is a statutory close or a closely held corporation,
and that its participants wish to preserve its closeness by, for example,
restricting share ownership to persons actively engaged in the busi-
ness, can form the basis of a judicial finding of reasonableness in
case of subsequent litigation.
F. Triggering Events
The events which trigger the obligation of the shareholder to sell
and the obligation of the named buyer to purchase shares must be
clearly specified. Normally, these events are the death, retirement,
resignation, disability or expulsion of a shareholder-employee. Whether
or not to make the mandatory buy-out provision applicable to all or
only some of these events is very much dependent upon the particular
facts of each case. If a particular shareholder has no spouse or
descendant able and willing to participate actively in the business, it
is normally in the best interest of the corporation and the other
shareholders to purchase his shares as soon as his relationship to the
corporation is terminated. Permitting his shares to be transferred to
someone who will not be actively participating in the enterprise,
raises the generally undesirable prospect of having inactive share-
holders whose interests may conflict with those of the active share-
holders. For example, while active employee-shareholders are normally
desirous of distributing available corporate profits (for tax reasons,
by way of salaries and fringe benefits) and of expanding the business
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through reinvestment of corporate capital, inactive shareholders tend
to look at the declaration of dividends for their share of corporate
profits. On the other hand, it may be advantageous to the corporation
and to the other shareholders to permit a shareholder to bequeath
his shares to a family member who is already active in the business
or who is capable of taking his place at the time of the shareholder's
death or retirement. In the latter situation, the combination of a
mandatory buy-out provision limited to the involuntary termination
of the shareholder's employment, and an optional sale of the shares
upon his death or retirement, might be appropriate.
Occasionally, triggering events other than the ones mentioned are
desired for a mandatory buy-out agreement by the participant. It
should be kept in mind that, with respect to corporations which need
to qualify the issuance of their shares under the California securities
law, triggering events other than death or termination of employment
will only be permitted under unusual circumstances or if their impact
is not considered unfair, unjust or inequitable by the Commissioner
of Corporations.
G. Choosing the Designated Buyer or Buyers
The designated buyer of shares subject to a buy-out agreement can
be the corporation or the other shareholders. Whom to designate
involves the same problems discussed previously in connection with
designating the option-holder under a first-option transfer restric-
tion.'2
H. Purchase Price
Available options with regard to the determination of the price at
which shares are purchased under a buy-out agreement are the same
as discussed previously in connection with first-option transfer res-
trictions. 123
122. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text (Section VI.D. discusses choosing the
option holder).
123. See supra notes 87-107 and accompanying text (Sections VI.J-O discusses various
methods for setting the purchase price in transfer restrictions).
1164
1989 / Protection of Shareholder Interests
VIII. CONCLUSION
The substance of this article has dealt with the pragmatic consid-
erations involved in protecting the shareholders of closely held and
statutory close California corporations in two respects. The first is
the maintenance of proportional voting and financial interests and
their protection against dilution. The second is the maintenance of
control over who is allowed to become a member of what is usually
a close-knit group. In adopting any of the devices described in this
article, one final cardinal rule needs to be observed. Careful drafting
is essential. If prepared forms obtained from printed kits or form
books are used, they must be carefully analyzed so that changes,
additions and deletions appropriate to the facts and circumstances
of the particular business enterprise are utilized.
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